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This is a comment on Lofstedt and Bouder’s paper, which explores the prospects 
of evidence based uncertainty analysis in Europe, focusing on the ongoing 
development on uncertainty analysis at the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA). We very much welcome a discussion on the need to develop better 
treatment and communication of uncertainty in risk analysis, as we believe that 
such discussion is long overdue. Lofstedt and Bouder raise many relevant points, 
in particular the call for evidence based uncertainty analysis. However, there is 
need to distinguish different types of communication in the discussion and 
facilitate - not diminish - the description and communication of uncertainty 
between risk assessors and decision makers. We find that EFSA has taken steps 
towards a novel approach to guide their scientific experts and risk assessors in 
uncertainty analysis based on a modern and scientific view on uncertainty.
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Introduction
In this short piece, we comment on Lofstedt and Bouder’s paper (2017), which explores 
the prospect of evidence based uncertainty analysis in Europe, focusing on the ongoing 
development on uncertainty analysis at the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). 
We very much welcome a discussion on the need to develop better treatment and 
communication of uncertainty in risk analysis, as we believe that such discussion is long
overdue.
Similarily to Lofstedt and Bouder, we describe and refer to what is in a guidance
for uncertainty analysis drafted by EFSA (2016). We emphasize that EFSA’s guidance is
just a draft, and does not yet represents EFSA’s official view. For example, the draft 
guidance is still subject to trialing and internal testing, and might well change 
substantially after this process. The final version is not expected until the end of 2017 
(https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/press/news/160321). 
Uncertainty analysis in flux
We agree with Lofstedt and Bouder that new approaches for uncertainty analysis are 
required to meet the challenges faced by today’s decision makers. Because of the 
increasing scale as well as the increasing mathematical and social complexity of 
systems being studied, uncertainty analysis needs to embrace quality of knowledge, 
subjective aspects of risk, decision context, and stakeholders. In addition, we welcome 
progress to ensure that, in practice, uncertainty analysis is built upon a proper scientific 
basis. Luckily, uncertainty analysis is already in flux. 
The subjective dimension of probability (to represent uncertainty) can be traced 
back as far 1660 (Hacking 2006), and has been part of probability theory ever since its 
conception. In certain circles, during a major part of the 20th century, “subjective” 
became synonymous with “non-scientific” or “biased” (Cox 2006). Today, the swing is 
going in the other direction, and the subjective dimension of uncertainty (and risk) is 
being studied and acknowledged much more explicitly, in academic discussions (see 
e.g. Aven and Guikema 2011) as well as in applied fields such as medicine (Sox, 
Higgins, and Owens 2013; Fischhoff and Davis 2014). 
In decision contexts, a conceptual and sound understanding of uncertainty is 
required to build a scientific approach to uncertainty analysis. This includes, for 
example, viewing uncertainty not just as an add-on, but as part of the description of risk,
using uncertainty to support decisions, and acknowledging the subjective dimension of 
uncertainty where necessary. 
Recently, the Society for Risk Analysis produced a paper discussing whether risk
could be viewed as the assessor’s uncertainty about events and consequences, given the 
background knowledge and its strength (Aven et al. 2015). Thus, there is an ongoing 
discussion on how to better account for differences in strength of knowledge bases used 
in risk assessment, and in general knowledge production to support decisions. Due to 
the complexity of the required analysis of risk, possible conflicts of interest, and values 
at stake, decisions on how to treat uncertainty must be reconsidered for every 
assessment problem, often in an iterative process. 
An emphasis on the decision context is put forward by ISO (ISO 31000 
(2009)/ISO Guide 73:2002) where risk is defined as the “effect of uncertainty on 
objectives”. This view is quite different compared to the more traditional view that risk 
can be reduced to likelihoods and consequences (Kaplan and Garrick 1981) or 
properties of a complex system (Haimes 2009). It is being acknowledged that the way in
which risk should be described depends on the (assessment) question asked. 
Even though EFSA’s draft guidance is not yet adopted by EFSA, we follow 
Lofstedt and Bouder and revisit how uncertainty is viewed in EFSA’s draft from 2016. 
The draft considers uncertainty to be any type of limitation in available knowledge that 
affects the range and probability of possible answers to an assessment question (EFSA 
2016 p. 20). By available knowledge, they mean knowledge (evidence, data, etc.) 
available to assessors at the time the assessment is conducted and within the time and 
resources agreed for the assessment (EFSA 2016 p. 20). Consequently, uncertainty is 
conditional on the knowledge that is relevant to the assessment and available to those 
conducting the assessment, at the time that the assessment is conducted, and also 
conditional on the assessors involved (EFSA 2016 p. 30). It is also clarified that there is 
no single “true” uncertainty (EFSA 2016 p. 30), which argues for evaluating an analysis 
of uncertainty based its logic rather than on its performance of outcomes in hindsight. 
To conclude, the view on uncertainty in the draft guidance is well motivated and in line 
with recent developments of uncertainty analysis.
Also, with such perspectives on risk and uncertainty, it becomes very difficult 
for uncertainty analysis to NOT be an integral part of risk assessment, which is one of 
the concerns raised by Lofstedt and Bouder. Different from Lofstedt and Bouder, we 
don’t find that the draft guidance suggests uncertainty analysis as something that will be
published along-side the scientific opinion. We’d like to emphasize that the “tools” 
offered in the draft guidance are not just a set of methods, but also includes:
 a conceptual framework for uncertainty,
 a range of different approaches for uncertainty analysis depending on the 
problem at hand and the resources available, and 
 a support framework to make an informed choice about the methods to derive 
uncertainty in the output of the risk assessment.
In practice, new ideas on uncertainty are being picked up at a slow pace. An acceptance 
of subjective probability in an academic discourse does not mean that it is fully 
established in practice or in the teaching of future decision makers and risk assessors. In
fact, we experience a large variation between scientific disciplines, fields of 
applications, and countries. Thus, widening the view on uncertainty and uncertainty 
analysis in scientific risk assessment will take time. We believe that EFSA’s ongoing 
work is a step in the right direction.
“Evidence based” uncertainty analysis
We welcome Lofstedt and Bouder’s initiative to raise the discussion on what is needed 
to develop an evidence based uncertainty analysis. Note that the term “evidence based 
uncertainty analysis” might be taken to mean two things:
(1) Uncertainty analysis should be based on evidence such as high quality data, well
established mathematical models, unanimously agreed expert opinions, and so 
on.
(2) The procedures for the uncertainty analysis itself (i.e. how to treat and 
communicate uncertainty) should be based on the premise that there is evidence 
that these procedures work well.
The first sense will hopefully be obvious to readers. Lofstedt and Bouder are clearly 
concerned with evidence based uncertainty in the second sense, which is a lot less 
trivial. For example, what type of evidence is asked for? Also, it can be discussed if 
evidence based uncertainty communication is a better term, with the argument that 
analysis is motivated by the need to communicate and setting the limitations of what to 
communicate. 
Evidence for the treatment of procedures for uncertainty analysis can take many 
forms, including:
(1) Logical arguments, mathematical soundness and consistency.
(2) Case studies (possibly comparative) on theoretical problems.
(3) Case studies (possibly comparative) on real world applications.
An important question to ask is whether we need evidence from case studies at all if we 
already have good logical arguments for a particular procedure in a specific situation.
For communication of uncertainty, matters become often really tricky, and we 
envisage the type of evidence produced by social scientists on the communication and 
perception of risk (such as White and Johnson 2010, and several of the references 
provided by Lofstedt and Bouder). There is an opportunity here to combine the 
scientific perspective on treatment and the social perspective on communication to 
create a new agenda for evidence based uncertainty analysis. We believe that this is 
exactly the opportunity identified in Lofstedt and Bouder’s paper.
Structured procedures for using expert knowledge in risk assessment (e.g. 
formal and semi-formal expert knowledge elicitation) are good examples of situations 
where both scientific and social perspectives are combined. These procedures have a 
strong theoretical basis, but are also designed to deal with cognitive biases and 
heuristics identified by social sciences (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; O'Hagan et al. 
2006). Other good examples are studies of the effects of the assessor’s choice of how to 
describe and communicate uncertainty. This choice can be based on evidence of what 
enables the public to learn and understand the message (Dieckmann et al. 2016). Finally,
there is plenty of research on how to communicate uncertainty in a way that avoids 
unnecessary reactions from recipients resulting from the manner in which the 
communication is done. We strongly support Lofstedt and Bouder’s advice to test risk 
messages before making them public, especially on socially sensitive matters. 
With a broader view on uncertainty analysis, there are other sources of 
uncertainty to consider. For example, bias can result from the decisions taken by the risk
assessors themselves, values (Vareman and Persson 2010) and (as identified by Lofstedt
and Bouder) path-dependence, i.e. one tends to use the methods, models, theories that 
one already spent a lot of time on. Maxim and van der Sluijs (2011) identify this as a 
procedural source of uncertainty. Here, it would be useful to have evidence of the 
severity of such sources of biases (how common are they and should we worry about 
them?), and evidence on the effect of methods to reduce their impact on a risk 
assessment.
The role of uncertainty quantification
Lofstedt and Bouder write that “trying to develop new quantifications to capture 
uncertainties will be of limited interest because biases will be introduced to constrain or 
distort the analysis”. Even though they not directly refer to what is in the draft guidance 
by EFSA, we would like to clarify the use of quantification therein. First, the draft 
guidance is not introducing any methods that are new: the methods included are all well 
established in the literature as well as in practice. Second, the draft guidance is 
promoting qualitative analysis as complement to quantitative ones, e.g. the NUSAP 
analysis (van der Sluijs et al. 2005; Fischhoff and Davis 2014) is included. The draft 
guidance is in fact very comprehensive and is quite novel as a guidance for uncertainty 
analysis, as it includes an extremely wide range of methods, along with support for what
and when to use those methods.
Quantification is a scientific approach to describe the states of the world. 
However, we know that quantification of our uncertainty about unobserved or partially 
observable states of the world is challenged due to the epistemic and value laden nature 
of risk assessment, and that is why uncertainty analysis, reflecting the limits of our 
knowledge, is so important.
Understanding all flavors of quantification takes time and experience. Here, we 
would like to take the opportunity to explain how we perceive what the draft guidance is
trying to achieve with respect to quantification.
First, there is a clarification of roles. Decision makers are responsible for 
resolving the impact of uncertainty on decisions, which requires weighing the scientific 
assessment against other considerations (EFSA 2016 p. 23). Risk assessors are 
responsible for characterizing uncertainty, which requires scientific expertise. These are 
seen as two conceptually distinct activities, but interaction between them is essential 
(EFSA 2016 p. 23). The draft guidance seeks to improve this interaction with regard to 
uncertainty analysis. First, they identify what the decision maker wants to know:
 What is the range of possible answers, and how probable are they?
 Is further investigation needed?
 What are the main sources of uncertainty affecting the outcome of the 
assessment?
Second, it sets requirements and preferred aims of an uncertainty analysis. It is 
necessary to characterise the combined uncertainty on the assessment questions, since 
this is what matters for decision making. In addition, the combined uncertainty on the 
output should be quantified, either by calculation or by expert judgment.
It is not necessary to characterise all uncertainties individually. The draft 
guidance recognises that assessors may be unable to quantify some sources of 
uncertainty. If so, they should identify and describe these.
It is necessary to characterise the combined uncertainty on the assessment 
questions, since this is what matters for decision making. In addition, the combined 
uncertainty on the output should be quantified, either by calculation or by expert 
judgment.
An iteration of an uncertainty analysis consists of four steps:
(1) Identify sources of uncertainty
(2) Assess individual sources of uncertainty
(3) Assess the combined impact of individual sources of uncertainty on uncertainty 
in the assessment output
(4) Assess the relative contribution of individual sources to uncertainty in 
assessment output
The draft guidance contain descriptions on what each method to assess uncertainty can 
do and cannot do, relative to the form of uncertainty that the method provides 
(qualitative or quantitative, ranges, intervals, or probability distributions) and which of 
the  steps (1 to 4) are covered by a method (EFSA 2016 Table 7). In addition, the draft 
guidance provides an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each method with 
respect to ten criteria (EFSA 2016 Table 6). This is an innovative and novel approach, 
since it encourages risk assessors (including scientific experts) to make an active and 
informed decision about the (combination of) methods to use for a specific uncertainty 
analysis, depending on the knowledge basis and type of problem, in accordance with 
requirements on the level of the uncertainty analysis. 
Uncertainty transparency: about what and to whom?
Communicating uncertainty is about communicating what we know, and clarifying the 
limitations of our current knowledge. Lofstedt and Bouder are worried about the 
consequences of being transparent about uncertainty, i.e. what we know and don’t know.
In this sometimes confusing discussion, there is a need to distinguish between 
analyzing uncertainty in risk assessment and communicating uncertainty in various 
contexts. In all circumstances, uncertainty must be described before there is anything to 
communicate. How uncertainty is described sets the limits of what is possible to 
communicate, not necessarily saying that everything must be communicated. 
Transparency of the process to analyze uncertainty is important for the perception and 
accountability in the uncertainty being communicated (Fischhoff and Davis 2014). 
Consequently, the draft guidance (EFSA 2016) provides a structured process for 
scientific panels to decide which methods to use for uncertainty analysis, with the 
purpose to increase transparency in the process. Assessors are asked to report identified 
sources of uncertainty, how uncertainty is expressed, the methods used, and the 
combined uncertainty in output and influential sources of uncertainty (EFSA 2016 Table
S.2). 
In our view, subjectivity in scientific analysis is impossible to avoid. A more 
transparent uncertainty analysis will bring the subjective nature of scientific analysis 
much more to the forefront. That is exactly why it is important for us scientists to admit 
subjectivity whenever we must make a subjective assessment. Therefore, we welcome 
that the draft guidance also explicitly acknowledges this dimension of uncertainty.
In addition, there is a request to be transparent about knowledge itself. Lofstedt 
and Bouder compare being transparent about uncertainty to being transparent about 
data. In our view, there is a difference between making data publicly available and 
informing decision makers on the combined uncertainty in an assessment output. We 
think that this concern about transparency must be treated differently depending on the 
parties involved: is it about communication between the risk assessor and the decision 
maker, between the risk assessor and the public, or between the decision maker and the 
public? 
Lofstedt and Bouder argue that being more open to analyze uncertainties may 
lead academics critical of the dominant risk analysis model to argue for policy not based
on evidence and informed by risk. This is a valid concern, but not a valid argument to 
ignore uncertainty when assessing risks. For instance, we do not see the valid worry of 
more frequent applications of the precautionary principle as an argument to stop risk 
assessors (e.g. EFSA) from describing and communicating uncertainty to decision 
makers (e.g. DG SANTE). Even though being transparent about the limits of the 
scientific knowledge available to a decision maker might incur fear in the public, should
a risk assessor be worried about communicating what they know, and the limits thereof, 
to the decision maker if in fact there really is a large degree of uncertainty? What would 
happen if a risk assessor would be accused of hiding uncertainty to decision makers? 
Most members of the public naturally favor being part of a society governed by decision
makers who are certain, but are they really willing to accept that decision makers at the 
same time are denied information that could influence the decisions made, and thereby 
affect their own safety? 
Lofstedt and Bouder (Lofstedt and Bouder 2017) are worried that an authority 
like EFSA might lose public trust by acknowledging uncertainty. Ignoring known 
sources of uncertainty to avoid losing trust is quite controversial, and seen as an 
immoral act by some. Public trust can be lost, but also gained, from being transparent 
about uncertainty (White and Johnson 2010). 
In our view, the way forward is simply to become better in uncertainty analysis. 
Adequate training of scientific experts, risk assessors, decision makers and facilitators 
of knowledge production and communication is required, not only at EFSA, but in the 
larger community of scientists and practitioners. Before uncertainty analysis can be 
“evidence based”, there a need to establish a scientific perspective on uncertainty 
analysis. EFSA have taken the initiative to provide a comprehensive “conceptual 
model” for uncertainty analysis. There is, to our knowledge, no previous guidance of 
uncertainty analysis taking this approach. 
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